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Background
In this paper, we analyse whether the foreign ownership of manufacturing companies 
in Sweden has affected their technical efficiency, compared with their domestically 
owned (DO) counterparts. Efficiency measurement potentially captures a broader range 
of changes within firms than the more traditional productivity measurement does, but 
despite their obvious importance, the efficiency impacts of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) remain less well explored.
The fact that productivity increases when companies become foreign-owned (FO) is 
widely known (see e.g. JBIC 2002 for a review of literature in the field). There is, how-
ever, less analysis of the effects of foreign ownership on technical efficiency. In general 
we can say that, when a firm becomes more technically efficient, it automatically also 
becomes more productive. However, the reverse does not hold, i.e. increased productiv-
ity does not automatically cause higher technical efficiency. Productivity can improve 
either because available resources are used more efficiently, given the existing tech-
nology, because the technology itself improves, or (if measured as output per worker) 
because the amount of capital per worker increases. It is well known that foreign inves-
tors can bring in new technologies; however, given the various constraints that a foreign 
owner faces in comparison with a domestic owner, there is a risk that part of the produc-
tivity gain due to improved technology might be offset by reduced efficiency. If this hap-
pens, a country which seeks to attract FDI because of the anticipated benefits may in fact 
be foregoing some of these benefits without recognizing it, because the efficiency losses 
are masked by gains in other areas.
Abstract 
A number of studies have found that foreign direct investment (FDI) can have positive 
impacts on productivity. However, while FDI has clearly positive impacts on technology 
transfers, its effects on resource use within firms is less clear and, in principle, efficiency 
losses might offset some of the productivity gains associated with improved technolo-
gies. In this paper, we study the impacts of FDI on efficiency in Swedish manufactur-
ing. We find that foreign ownership has positive impacts on efficiency, supporting the 
earlier findings on productivity.
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Until the early 1990s, FDI and foreign ownership were scarce in Sweden (Henrekson 
and Jakobsson 2005). This was partly due to a range of regulations. Before the 1990s, 
Sweden had a restrictive approach to FDI, with overlapping public and private rules and 
regulations as well as formal barriers to such investment. These measures included laws 
that allowed Swedish companies to restrict foreign ownership, laws that required foreign 
investors to apply for permission to acquire a Swedish company, a system of consent and 
strict practice (OECD 1993), and the regulation of foreign exchange flows. These meas-
ures were abolished around 1992,1 resulting in a significant inflow of FDI from then 
onward. Current Swedish policy is to encourage FDI, precisely because of the perceived 
benefits that foreign investors can bring; the Swedish foreign ministry has a specific divi-
sion whose task it is to encourage foreign investors.
In 1980, just over 5 % of all workers in Sweden were employed by FO companies. By 
2005, the proportion of workers employed in FO firms had jumped to almost 25 % of 
the country’s total employees. This corresponds to about 100,000 employees in 1980 and 
about 550,000 in 2005 (see Table 4 in Appendix).
The discussion in the rest of the paper is structured as follows: the second section 
provides a brief background on previous literature studying the impacts of FDI on pro-
ductivity and efficiency. The third section presents the empirical method, namely the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis approach, and the model specification used. The fourth sec-
tion provides an overview of the data used in the paper, while the fifth section presents 
the results of the analysis. In the concluding section, the results are discussed.
Previous literature
Foreign ownership affects companies in host countries in many different ways. These 
include impacts on the setting of wages, negotiating employment terms, spill-over 
effects, and productivity. In this review section, we will focus on studies investigating 
whether foreign ownership affects productivity and efficiency.
An extensive literature exists on productivity and foreign ownership. For example, 
a number of studies have shown that productivity in manufacturing companies has 
increased when such companies are taken over by foreign owners. In addition, these 
studies show that increases in productivity have been significantly higher for FO compa-
nies than for their DO counterparts.
The motives for a foreign investor to invest abroad are discussed by Girma et al. (2005), 
who argue that only the most productive firms find it profitable to meet the higher costs 
associated with FDI. In an earlier study, Girma et al. (2001) showed that, in the United 
Kingdom (UK), labour productivity was 10 % higher in FO firms in the first half of the 
1990s, while the total factor productivity was 5 % higher in FO than DO firms. Harris 
and Robinson (2002), in their study on companies operating in the UK during the period 
1974–1995, showed that foreign owners “cherry-picked” highly productive enterprises 
to invest in; their study also revealed that FO firms were 40 % more productive than their 
DO equivalents. Salis (2008) found similar results using Slovenian data for the 1994–
1999 period. In a Norwegian study, Balsvik and Haller (2010), using data from between 
1 Sweden went through a deep crisis in the early 1990s, culminating in a turbulent 1992 when, among other things, Swe-
den switched from a fixed to a floating exchange rate.
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1992 and 2004, established that FO companies selected “cherries” and managed to 
improve them further, while “lemons” were left to new DO buyers that seemed unable to 
do more than bring performance back to pre-acquisition levels. Results from an Italian 
study by Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006), who investigated manufacturing firms oper-
ating there between 1992 and 1999, revealed that the average FO firm was more likely 
to operate in high-tech industries, and was more productive than a DO firm. Ford et al. 
(2008), using aggregate data from 48 states in the United States (US) between 1978 and 
1997, similarly found that FO firms outperformed DO firms in respect of productivity.
Studies based on Swedish data showed that DO firms also increased their productivity 
levels when they passed into foreign ownership. Hansson et al. (2007) showed that a pos-
itive correlation existed between foreign ownership and increased productivity. How-
ever, although the positive productivity effects of multinational ownership remained, 
they were weaker when one took the industrial sector and other controllable factors into 
account. This outcome of the study suggested there were structural, owner-specific rea-
sons for the higher productivity. Another Swedish study, conducted by Modén (1998), 
also showed that Swedish companies increased their productivity when they passed 
into foreign hands. In the case of acquisitions, the investigation by Bandick and Karpaty 
(2011) revealed that Swedish companies exhibited 8 % higher total factor productivity, 
on average, after being acquired by foreign investors, in comparison with companies 
solely in Swedish possession.
Multinational companies can transfer foreign knowledge and foreign methods of pro-
duction that DO firms do not have as easy access to. The evidence suggests that multi-
national firms employ more skilled workers (Görg and Greenaway 2004) and produce 
more advanced products (Kokko et al. 2001). Driffield and Love (2003) show that mul-
tinational companies are more research- and capital-intensive than DO companies are.
However, the notion of productivity should not be confused with that of efficiency. 
While productivity is the ratio of a firm’s output to its input, efficiency takes the form of 
the ratio of observed output to maximum potential output obtainable from given input, 
the ratio of minimum observed potential input required to produce given output, or 
some combination of these two.
Thus, for example, according to Moran et  al. (2005), foreign owners can use host 
resources more efficiently and, by way of spill-overs, foreign ownership of a host country 
business contributes towards making it more efficient than before. This is not a given, 
however. There are several functions in a company’s business that are duplicated when 
the firm is owned by foreigners, including marketing and reporting to local authorities 
(who may be hostile to foreign owners in practice, regardless of what the official policy is) 
as well as building up relationships with local staff and local providers. Markusen (2002) 
and Bürker et al. (2013) demonstrate that these costs are important aspects of multina-
tional companies’ decision on whether or not to produce abroad, and these added costs 
could potentially reduce the efficiency of firms that become FO. On the other hand, an 
important role that FDI can play is to effectively improve competition in the local mar-
kets and, at the company level, this could lead to improved efficiency as well. Thus, while 
productivity can be expected to improve as a result of FDI, the impact on efficiency is 
less obvious. Helpman et  al. (2004) and Girma et  al. (2005) found that only the most 
productive firms choose to set up operations in foreign countries, while less productive 
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firms prefer to simply expand production in their home country and either export more 
or (for even less productive firms) sell more domestically.
That only the most productive firms see a gain to FDI rather than exporting shows 
that the transaction costs involved in setting up operations in another country are a real 
concern. Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) found that technology transfers to foreign 
subsidiaries only take place when there are large technology differences between the 
foreign owner and the subsidiary, and not when the technology differences are smaller. 
This suggests—again—that there are important transactions costs involved, and that the 
gains from technology transfers have to be large in order to make it worthwhile to over-
come the costs involved. Ford et al. (2008), comparing impacts of FDI on productivity in 
different US states, found that the level of human capital in the recipient state mattered 
for the productivity impact, again suggesting that conditions in the recipient area (other 
than those of the subsidiary firm receiving the investment) are crucial.
The impacts of FDI and foreign ownership on efficiency, rather than productivity, 
have therefore been studied in a growing (albeit still smaller than that for productiv-
ity) literature. Li (2008) studied firms that expanded abroad and found that they tended 
to become less efficient, at least in an initial phase of their expansion. Banalieva et al. 
(2012), also studying impacts on multinational enterprises as a whole, find similar effects 
of foreign expansion; they also find that the efficiency losses are smaller if the FDI is 
aimed at countries that are already integrated economically with the firm’s home coun-
try. Kinda (2012), comparing efficiency impacts of FDI in several developing and emerg-
ing economies, found that the investment climate in the recipient country had a marked 
effect not only for the efficiency impact in the FO firms but also for the efficiency in 
the local firms selling to them. This suggests that whether FDI and FO firms will see 
improved efficiency or not will depend on the recipient country and may also depend on 
the recipient sector. Saranga and Phani (2009), studying efficiency in the Indian pharma-
ceutical industry, found that the FO firms tended to see efficiency improve, and Suyanto 
and Salim (2013) found similar results for Indonesian pharmaceuticals. On the other 
hand, when studying two different Indonesian manufacturing sectors (Suyanto and 
Salim 2010), they found that FDI led to increased efficiency in one sector but reduced 
efficiency in the other. Khalifah (2013), studying Malaysia’s automotive industry, found 
that FO firms were more efficient overall, but that this was not the case in all the compo-
nent subsectors of the industry.
Whether FDI leads to improved efficiency, as opposed to “merely” increased pro-
ductivity, is not merely an academic issue. Görg and Greenaway (2004) note that many 
countries, as well as regional and local jurisdictions, provide direct and indirect subsi-
dies to foreign investors in the hope that this will attract productive companies to their 
jurisdictions. FO companies are indeed more productive than their DO counterparts, as 
the literature reviewed above indicates. However, if transaction costs linked to establish-
ing foreign affiliates are important, in the sector or in the country as a whole, part of the 
productivity gains may be lost. If FO firms see reduced efficiency, the recipient countries 
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forego some of the economic gains from FDI that they are trying to achieve; and if they 
observe only the productivity gains, they may not realise that those gains could have 
been even higher. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate whether the increased pro-
ductivity observed for FO firms in Sweden is associated with reduced or increased effi-
ciency, in order to ascertain whether the climate for foreign investors lets the country 
make full use of its potential gains from FDI. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to study 
whether foreign participation affects technical efficiency in Swedish manufacturing, and 
whether the effects vary by sector.
Stochastic production frontier analysis
The model in the present paper is based on that devised by Battese and Coelli (1995) and 
can be described as follows. The stochastic production frontier function for panel data is 
assumed to be
where yit denotes the production at time t (t = 1, 2, . . . ,T ) of the ith firm (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N ) , 
xit is a (1 × h) vector of values of inputs of production and other explanatory variables 
associated with the ith firm at the tth observation, β is a (h ×  1) vector of values of 
parameters to be estimated, νit is a random error and uit is the technical inefficiency of 
the firm. The νits are assumed to be iid N (0, σ 2ν ) random errors, which are assumed to be 
independently distributed of the uits. Thus, a firm with no technical inefficiency (uit = 0) 
will have an output given by f(xit; β) times a random term exp(νit) with expectation value 
one.
The uits are non-negative random variables, associated with technical inefficiency of 
production, which are assumed to be independently distributed, such that uit is obtained 
by truncation at zero of a normal distribution with mean zitδ and variance σ2. The vec-
tor of explanatory variables, zit, has the dimension (1 × m) where δ is a (m × 1) vector 
of unknown coefficients. The technical inefficiency term uit in the stochastic frontier in 
model Eq. (1) can be written as
where wit is a random variable which is defined by a truncation of the normal distribu-
tion with zero mean and variance σ2, so that the truncation point is −zitδ, i.e. wit ≥ −zitδ . 
This assumption is consistent with uit being a non-negative truncation for N (−zitδ, σ 2) . 
The assumption that uit and νit are independently distributed for all t = 1, 2, …, T and 
i = 1, 2, …, N is a simplifying, but obviously also relatively restrictive, condition. Battese 
and Tessema (1993) suggest applying the method of maximum likelihood for simultane-
ous estimation of the parameters in the stochastic frontier model and in the inefficiency 
model.
The technical efficiency (TE) of production for the ith firm at the t-th observation is 
therefore defined by
The prediction of the technical inefficiency is based on its conditional expectation, 
given the model assumptions (Battese and Coelli 1992).
(1)yit = f (xit;β) exp {νit − uit}
(2)uit = zitδ + wit
(3)TEit = exp {−uit} = exp {−zitδ − wit}
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The stochastic frontier of the production function is estimated as a standard translog 
production function with production determined by capital input k and labour input l, 
and with coefficients potentially changing over time:
With this setup, we see that it is possible for a firm to increase its productivity over time 
but simultaneously see its inefficiency increase, the potential outcome that concerns us 
for the FO firms. The net outcome might then still be an increase in overall production, 
but a smaller increase than would have occurred if inefficiency had remained constant 
or decreased. Including foreign ownership as one of the determinants of u lets us see 
whether foreign ownership affects efficiency positively or negatively.
Since each industry can be assumed to have its own technology, the model is estimated sep-
arately for each industrial sector, defined at the three-digit standard industrial classification 
(SIC) level. However, a pooled model for the entire manufacturing sector is also estimated.
Differentiating logyit with respect to log kit and log lit, respectively, gives us the pro-
duction elasticities with regard to capital and labour. Taking the sum of both elasticities 
lets us measure returns to scale, RTS. RTS is expected to be approximately 1 for most 
sectors; the two elasticities are expected to be greater than zero but less than one for all 
sectors, but may vary considerably between different sectors.
Differentiating with respect to t gives us the rate of technical change, TC, which is 
expected to be on the order of a few per cent per year.
The technical inefficiency effects are assumed to be defined by
where ownership is a vital variable to incorporate in the efficiency function in the pre-
sent paper, since different owners are assumed to behave differently when it comes to 
managing. We only consider different management with respect to the relevant owner’s 
domicile, i.e. whether the firm is DO or FO. This was done using a dummy variable for 
FO firms (where FO =  0 if it is a DO firm, and where FO =  1 if it is an FO firm). A 
(4)















+ νit − uit
(5)ekit = βk + βkk log kit + βkl log lit + βkt t
(6)elit = βl + βll log lit + βkl log kit + βlt t
(7)RTS = ekit + e
l
it
(8)TC = βt + βkt log kit + βlt log lit + βtt t > 0
(9)uit = δ0 + δFOFOit + δk/l(k/l)+ δk·l(k · l)+ δt t + δD92D92it + εit
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positive sign for δFO would imply that FO firms are more inefficient than DO firms, while 
a negative sign would imply the opposite. The k/l term, which measures capital intensity, 
is included in order to explain whether or not high capital intensity affects efficiency, 
whereas k × l, which measures the cross-elasticity of capital and labour, is included so 
that we can see whether economies of scale affect efficiency. We also include a general 
time trend t, as well as a 1992 dummy which is used for controlling whether manage-
ment practices changed after the turbulence of 1992. ɛit, finally, is a random variable. 
There are no a priori expectations from theory for any of the coefficients in the ineffi-
ciency equation.
Data
The data we use is a panel data set for manufacturing firms in Sweden compiled by 
one of the authors (Brännlund et al. 2016). The panel covers the years 1980 to 2005, 
and consists of all manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees (as most FO firms 
have more employees than this, this helps ensure greater comparability between DO 
and FO firms; data errors are also more frequent among the smaller firms). Table 3 in 
the Appendix offers a classification of the industries. Since the classification of indus-
tries changed during the period studied, only firms that belong to the same industry 
in both classification systems (SNI69 and SNI92) are included. To be classified as an 
FO company, foreigners had to have more than 50  % of the votes in the company. 
Most of the variables were collected from each firm’s annual report, obtained from 
the Swedish Registrar of Companies. The information on the main owner’s origin was 
collected from each firm’s record of stock ownership at the time of the shareholders’ 
annual general meeting.
Several criteria were used to select firms for the study from the full data set. Firstly, 
in order for a firm to be included in the data set, it had to have at least 50 employees. 
Secondly, production had to be relatively homogeneous (which reduced the sample 
sharply). Thirdly, the firm had to have started its activity before 1992 (as noted, this year 
was important for controlling whether management practices had changed in the firm 
after the turbulence of 1992). Fourthly, the firm had to have at least 5 years of continuous 
activity (which makes it possible to study its operations for a longer period). These crite-
ria gave us a high share of Swedish-owned firms (nearly 50 %). The second-largest owner 
of firms in the data set was Finland: 8.5 % of all firms had Finnish owners during the 
period in question. In total, the data set consists of 242 firms that meet all of the above 
criteria for inclusion in the analysis.
Output is measured in real 1980 SEK. Labour input is measured as the number of 
employed individuals in the firm in the year in question, while the capital stock is meas-
ured as the real value of physical capital (machinery, equipment and buildings) in the 
firm. Average productivity during 1980–2005 among the firms that are included in the 
data set (Table 5 in Appendix) was 767,670 SEK per employee and year in constant 1980 
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Table 1 Maximum likelihood estimates for parameters of the inefficiency function for six 
manufacturing industries in Sweden and a pooled estimate, 1980–2005
Standard errors in brackets
Significance: * = 0.1 % level, ** = 1 % level, and *** = 5 % level
Variable Pooled, all 
sectors

































































































































































































































































Log-likelihood −2592.36 −12.69 −403.1 −380.88 −71.39 −1155.52 −87.13
Number of 
observations
4277 473 434 1023 377 1613 357
Number of  
cross-sections
240 25 21 59 19 90 20
Number of time 
periods
26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Average number 
of time periods
18 19 21 17 19 18 17
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prices. The average value of real capital was 145,383 SEK in 1980 prices, while the aver-
age number of employees was 314.
Results
Two-sample t tests (see Tables 7, 8, 9 in the Appendix for details) show that, on average, 
FO companies had more employees, larger capital stocks and higher productivity than 
Swedish-owned companies did. All three tests were significant at the 1  % level. Thus, 
the results confirm the finding that FO companies tend to have higher productivity per 
employee. However, the capital stock per employee is also greater; this explains at least 
some of the productivity difference, and thus investigating whether the FO companies 
use their resources more efficiently remains of interest.
The stochastic production function was estimated as a translog function using a maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) estimator. Table 1 presents the estimated parameters.
The stochastic production frontier model estimates in Table 1 indicate that for each 
industry, as well as for the pooled model, the parameters are in line with the theoretical 
expectations outlined in the previous section. All estimated elasticities for capital and 
labour (see Table 2) have reasonable values except for the capital elasticity for the Electro 
industry, which is not statistically significant. Returns to scale are below 1 for the pooled 
model as well as for most of the sector-level models, and for the one sector where it is 
greater than one it is not statistically significantly so. The technical change coefficients 
are all positive and of the expected magnitude, although not statistically significant for 
all sectors.
In the inefficiency model, we see that an increase in capital intensity sees a concom-
itant increase in inefficiency in all except the Beverage and Forest industries, and that 
it also increases inefficiency in the pooled model. On the other hand, when the scale 
increases, inefficiency declines in the Forest, Beverage and Electro sectors—for all of 
them significantly so. The time trends for inefficiency are insignificant except for the 
Beverage, Concrete and Metal industries, which become more inefficient over time. 
Table 2 Elasticities
Standard errors in brackets

























































No. of observations 4277 473 434 1021 775 1603 337
Page 10 of 17Svedin and Stage  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:614 
Moreover, the dummy variable for the year 1992 indicates significantly higher ineffi-
ciency from 1992 onwards for the Concrete and Metal sectors.
Looking at foreign ownership, the focus of our study, the significantly negative results 
in the pooled model and for the Forest, Beverage and Electro sectors indicate that, in 
those industries, foreign ownership improves efficiency. The tests of impacts of foreign 
ownership for the Chemical, Concrete and Metal industries are all insignificant. For the 
pooled model, the dummy variable for foreign ownership is negative, which indicates 
that, for the sample as a whole, firms with foreign owners become less inefficient. There 
is no sector where there is a statistically significant increase in inefficiency linked to for-
eign ownership.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to investigate whether foreign ownership affects 
Swedish manufacturing firms’ technological efficiency. Our results indicate that ineffi-
ciency in Swedish companies is affected by whether their owners are non-Swedish or 
Swedish: FO firms, taken as a whole, are less inefficient, and this remains true when 
studied at the sectoral level. For some sectors, there is a statistically significant decrease 
in inefficiency linked to foreign ownership, while for the others, there is no statistically 
significant effect at all. Thus, most of the FO firms seem to be either as inefficient as their 
DO counterparts, or less.
Previous studies on the foreign ownership of Swedish manufacturing firms have 
concluded that such companies become more productive when they are acquired by 
foreign owners; similar results have been found for other countries. However, since for-
eign ownership tends to bring with it better access to new technologies, productivity 
increases linked to better technologies might mask reduced resource efficiency linked to 
a more limited understanding of the local context. Thus, studying inefficiency gives us 
more informative results than productivity studies alone would. By examining the inef-
ficiency in a firm, we find evidence that FO companies are systematically more efficient 
than DO firms in some, but not all, sectors. Thus, the exact impact of foreign owner-
ship on productivity and efficiency is potentially less clear-cut than earlier studies have 
indicated, and the exact pathway through which foreign ownership affects resource use 
within firms deserves further study.
Nonetheless, one implication of these findings is that the shift in Swedish policy in 
the early 1990s, from discouraging foreign investors to encouraging them, appears to be 
working as intended. For those sectors where an owner-specific effect on efficiency is at 
all discernible, the effect of foreign ownership is to reduce inefficiency. As noted in the 
literature review, foreign investors in other countries have frequently found that trans-
actions costs associated with locating part of their production away from their home 
country reduce the efficiency of their operations, reducing the productivity gains from 
foreign ownership. We find no such effect for any of the Swedish sectors studied in this 
paper.
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Appendix
See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Table 3 Standard industrial classification (SIC) codes
Code SIC code Industries
D101 154,155 and 158 Manufacture of
 Vegetable and animal oils and fats
 Dairy products, and
 Other food products
D102 211 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
D134 241, 243,245 and 246 Manufacture of
 Basic chemicals
 Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics
 Soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfume and 
toilet preparations, and
 Other chemical products
D105 261 Manufacture of glass and glass products
D106 265, 266 and 268 Manufacture of
 Cement, lime and plaster
 Articles of concrete, plaster and cement, and
 Other non-metallic mineral products
D178 272, 273, 274, 282 and 283 Manufacture of
 Tubes
 Other first processing of iron and steel
 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metals, central heating radiators and 
boilers, and
 Steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
D109 286 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hard ware
D110 291 and 295 Manufacture of
 Machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft, 
vehicle and cycle engines, and
 Other special purpose machinery
D111 313 and 314 Manufacture of
 Insulated wire and cable, and
 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
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Table 4 Number of employees in foreign-owned firms and the share of employed in Swed-
ish manufacturing industry between 1980 and 2010







1981 125,928 5.9 10.5
1982 127,305 6.2 1.1
1983 131,832 6.5 3.6
1984 124,639 6.2 −5.5
1985 139,737 6.9 12.1
1986 148,378 7.0 6.2
1987 154,217 7.2 3.9
1988 192,629 9.0 24.9
1989 201,970 8.9 4.8
1990 206,886 8.7 2.4
1991 228,713 9.7 10.6
1992 222,062 9.9 −2.9
1993 210,252 10.0 −5.3
1994 214,014 10.5 1.8
1995 246,018 11.7 15.0
1996 278,016 12.9 13.0
1997 301,069 13.9 8.3
1998 333,395 15.0 10.7
1999 397,665 16.9 19.3
2000 446,893 19.0 12.4
2001 520,081 21.4 16.4
2002 530,758 21.7 2.1
2003 564,180 23.2 6.3
2004 544,579 23.0 −3.5
2005 557,496 22.9 2.4
Table 5 Descriptive statistics: employees, real wage, real capital stock and producer price 
index




 Average 380.670 102.015 120.419 1.000 527.677
 SD 458.088 16.694 198.044 0.000 467.661
 N 140 140 140 140 140
1981
 Average 362.772 96.779 108.853 1.100 528.211
 SD 429.298 16.144 153.160 0.059 555.370
 N 142 142 142 142 142
1982
 Average 348.964 107.327 100.325 1.248 531.286
 SD 409.256 18.125 120.072 0.091 586.822
 N 145 145 145 145 145
1983
 Average 321.640 123.549 94.516 1.383 554.124
 SD 375.437 28.233 97.095 0.093 646.312
 N 161 161 161 161 161
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Table 5 continued




 Average 343.937 134.405 96.264 1.459 570.520
 SD 394.163 33.501 114.198 0.176 637.916
 N 163 163 163 163 163
1985
 Average 338.498 150.485 101.642 1.634 607.034
 SD 392.101 36.783 107.794 0.148 616.439
 N 175 175 175 175 175
1986
 Average 339.335 168.176 107.425 1.567 608.682
 SD 395.867 48.242 111.470 0.147 566.676
 N 182 182 182 182 182
1987
 Average 330.091 177.979 114.492 1.591 608.608
 SD 380.371 46.432 115.814 0.200 490.681
 N 183 183 183 183 183
1988
 Average 327.784 186.348 115.364 1.683 632.459
 SD 391.832 34.749 121.198 0.257 596.536
 N 188 188 188 188 188
1989
 Average 327.684 212.848 115.339 1.823 643.367
 SD 404.388 42.121 107.256 0.277 632.380
 N 196 196 196 196 196
1990
 Average 308.922 222.191 126.175 1.890 666.083
 SD 377.647 42.114 117.663 0.227 566.517
 N 206 206 206 206 206
1991
 Average 304.545 227.469 130.401 1.919 639.876
 SD 370.322 53.231 115.357 0.239 591.731
 N 199 199 199 199 199
1992
 Average 281.522 269.071 145.968 1.900 657.930
 SD 348.292 50.193 132.164 0.242 577.893
 N 203 203 203 203 203
1993
 Average 272.443 262.533 149.437 1.978 727.018
 SD 347.710 73.071 129.173 0.237 715.529
 N 193 193 193 193 193
1994
 Average 273.926 291.073 146.483 2.087 838.569
 SD 343.040 70.973 118.811 0.232 842.387
 N 190 190 190 190 190
1995
 Average 293.260 312.103 153.163 2.307 858.497
 SD 372.044 63.009 126.385 0.287 835.354
 N 179 179 179 179 179
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Table 5 continued




 Average 305.206 352.906 201.958 2.291 893.090
 SD 410.042 247.275 573.254 0.309 1173.129
 N 180 180 180 180 180
1997
 Average 300.294 358.009 216.978 2.304 1031.706
 SD 395.837 61.249 598.871 0.296 1402.772
 N 180 180 180 180 180
1998
 Average 308.691 372.644 174.755 2.290 890.661
 SD 395.880 69.712 149.506 0.297 837.151
 N 175 175 175 175 175
1999
 Average 309.928 386.083 182.305 2.260 899.479
 SD 405.005 75.859 153.051 0.290 736.334
 N 167 167 167 167 167
2000
 Average 306.335 392.655 184.352 2.341 957.271
 SD 405.311 78.483 163.636 0.282 898.903
 N 164 164 164 164 164
2001
 Average 303.425 428.677 182.998 2.452 970.732
 SD 400.085 261.198 176.288 0.315 891.795
 N 153 153 153 153 153
2002
 Average 289.283 427.755 197.718 2.505 1092.468
 SD 392.218 80.294 183.278 0.312 1293.348
 N 145 145 145 145 145
2003
 Average 304.121 450.876 180.178 2.449 1012.040
 SD 433.587 98.539 165.626 0.332 860.525
 N 141 141 141 141 141
2004
 Average 297.526 466.846 180.526 2.498 1069.349
 SD 424.616 81.516 169.597 0.320 1016.827
 N 135 135 135 135 135
2005
 Average 299.907 496.293 175.090 2.643 1178.552
 SD 429.309 112.203 170.629 0.406 1063.831
 N 129 129 129 129 129
Average
 Average 313.577 271.733 145.383 1.942 767.670
 SD 393.360 147.857 215.975 0.500 821.586
 N 4414 4414 4414 4414 4414
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics: output, capital and labour by SIC code
SIC Output Capital Labour
150
 Average 356,059 164,550 436
 SD 449,901 241,820 465
 N 435 435 435
212
 Average 278,006 131,457 443
 SD 644,634 234,588 692
 N 478 478 478
241
 Average 453,981 286,064 379
 SD 504,375 517,519 379
 N 277 277 277
243
 Average 170,275 46,878 209
 SD 142,094 52,897 193
 N 326 326 326
245
 Average 107,802 20,575 153
 SD 86,663 24,158 118
 N 151 151 151
246
 Average 187,940 75,899 269
 SD 219,823 102,494 320
 N 272 272 272
261
 Average 173,338 115,855 353
 SD 139,482 134,515 328
 N 292 292 292
265
 Average 106,859 88,611 137
 SD 71,721 67,438 113
 N 72 72 72
268
 Average 60,258 31,248 137
 SD 43,468 21,133 86
 N 146 146 146
273
 Average 211,009 103,219 303
 SD 223,672 185,989 317
 N 531 531 531
274
 Average 749,996 113,034 419
 SD 899,288 115,769 515
 N 153 153 153
282
 Average 153,514 34,799 205
 SD 540,670 52,127 248
 N 229 229 229
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Table 6 continued
SIC Output Capital Labour
286
 Average 60,126 21,766 203
 SD 43,444 20,699 219
 N 146 146 146
291
 Average 125,900 39,135 266
 SD 182,999 68,052 348
 N 370 370 370
295
 Average 207,414 68,144 299
 SD 277,474 87,996 292
 N 190 190 190
313
 Average 246,809 70,225 353
 SD 246,577 78,962 328
 N 249 249 249
314
 Average 173,134 37,183 363
 SD 61,716 28,069 225
 N 97 97 97
Total
 Average 235,276 97,243.18 313.58
 SD 405,493.4 201,739.1 393.36
 N 4414 4414 4414
Table 7 Two-sample t test with  unequal variances, domestically owned versus  foreign-
owned, by labour productivity
Degrees of freedom 4332; t = −10.9567
Group Obs Mean SE SD
Domestically owned 2204 12,685.17 393.61 18,478.91
Foreign-owned 2210 18,410.50 343.6832 16,156.77
Table 8 Two-sample t-test with unequal variances, domestically owned vs foreign-owned, 
by capital
Degrees of freedom = 4412; t = −9.9353
Group Obs Mean SE SD
Domestically owned 2204 68,953.98 2723.222 127,846.5
Foreign-owned 2210 125,455.6 5326.524 251,813.6
Table 9 Two-sample t test with unequal variances, domestically owned vs foreign-owned 
by employees
Degrees of freedom = 4412; t = −4.6662
Group Obs Mean SE SD
Domestically owned 2204 285.9775 7.381161 346.5217
Foreign-owned 2210 341.1024 9.219415 433.4106
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